The manager of Venezuela’s drone program is an engineer who helped build ballistic missiles for Iran. The engineer’s identity raises new questions about the purposes behind Venezuela’s drone program. But it’s also only one part of a mystery involving drones shipped from Iran to Venezuela while hidden in secret cargo containing possibly more military hardware than just ‘bots.
According to El Nuevo Herald, the Spanish-language sister paper of The Miami Herald, US officials believe Iran shipped drones to Venezuela hidden in cargo containers. The date and specific port are not known, but Venezuela only received six drones — in a shipment of 70 containers carrying each more than 24,000 pounds of cargo. The cargo was camouflaged as material “from Venirauto (Venezuelan-Iranian Automotive) through a Chilean company,” a source told the newspaper.
The containers were headed for a Venezuelan air base and the location for the M2 drone project, named after the Mohajer, a light surveillance drone manufactured by Iran. The supervisor, Ramin Keshavarz, is member of the Revolutionary Guards and former employee of Iran’s Defense Industry Organization, a firm embargoed by the United States for overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile program. The stealthy cargo, the Iranian missile engineer, and more than a million pounds of unaccounted weight, was not all. “Excessively high” amounts of money are paid for the drone program, much higher than the total cost of the ‘bots.
Also under investigation is a Parchin Industries site in Morón, Venezuela. Parchin is believed to make fuel for Iran’s mid-range missiles and has been accused by the International Atomic Energy Agency of conducting explosive tests inside a containment chamber located in Iran. Morón also houses a joint Iranian-Venezuelan gunpowder factory. Venezuela is also testing six Iranian drone models, with three under “special suspicion” for being not what they seem: the Justiciero, Vengador and Venezolano drones. In other words, US officials believe these drones could be more than just drones.
Last week, Venezuela’s president and potentate Hugo Chavez acknowledged the drone program. “Of course we’re doing it, and we have the right to. We are a free and independent country,” Chavez said. He added that Venezuela does not “have any plans to harm anyone,” and that it is just one of many programs built “with the help of different countries including China, Russia, Iran, and other allied countries,” he said.
The drones also appear to be primarily used for surveillance, with limited — if any — ability to carry weapons. The Mohajer, which is used by Venezuela, does not carry weapons but can guide missiles by laser. And drones are meant to loiter, not travel long distances, which means it’s exceedingly unlikely that Venezuela and Iran will be able to team up and invade the United States with a fleet of robotic aircraft any time soon.
Or even reach Florida. The maximum range — about 1,200 miles — of an (unnamed) Venezuelan drone revealed in March might reach Florida, but no further, and even the former possibility is theoretical. Chavez also weighed in on the concerns. “Pretty soon someone is probably going to say there’s an atomic bomb on the tip of it,” he joked.
To understand Chavez’s comment, and to whom it’s directed, it’s important to note one common but poorly supported explanation for why Venezuela and Iran cooperate with each other. The explanation has Iran using Venezuela as a forward base against the United States. In this view, Venezuela is a location to store Iranian military assets, possibly even missiles. Therefore, it’s just a matter of time before Iran either lets loose with the hidden nukes, or provokes another Cuban Missile Crisis.
But the evidence for any military relationship — beyond defense projects like drones — is circumstantial, at best.
Venezuela and Iran have other reasons to cooperate. For one, it suits rhetoric from both Venezuela and Iranian leaders. Chavez’s political identity is partly defined by a demagogic opposition to the United States. Iran does not share Chavez’s socialist policy goals, but there is a common foe. And Iran uses Chavez as means to build international support against the sanctions.
But could the drone program also be a way to subvert the sanctions? Venezuela doesn’t have to be housing materials directly related to Iran’s nuclear program. Relocating ballistic missile development, which indirectly ties into a potential nuclear weapon, could bypass the embargo. It’s also another way to avoid the prying eyes of IAEA inspectors.
It’s also possible the secret, unaccounted cargo is not so subversive after all. A Venirauto office is reportedly located next to the air base where the containers were first spotted. In January 2011, a nearby arms depot exploded. But there is also speculation the site could be the location of a sensitive military project. But it couldn’t be a drone project, or could it? Adding to the mystery, a drone factory built at the site was never put into operation.
Wired
No comments:
Post a Comment